History of Woman Suffrage
Chapter 170 : It was reserved for our great country to recognize by const.i.tutional enactment that

It was reserved for our great country to recognize by const.i.tutional enactment that political equality of all citizens which religion, affection, and common sense should have long since accorded; it was reserved for America to sweep away the mist of prejudice and ignorance, and that chivalric condescension of a darker age, for in the language of Holy Writ, "The night is far spent, the day is at hand, let us therefore cast off the work of darkness and let us put on the armor of light. Let us walk honestly as in the day." It may be argued against the proposition that there still remains upon the statute books of some States the word "male" to an exclusion; but as the Const.i.tution, in its paramount character, can only be read by the light of the established principle, _ita lex Scripta est_, and as the subject of s.e.x is not mentioned, and the Const.i.tution is not limited either in terms or by necessary implication in the general rights of citizens to vote, this right can not be limited on account of anything in the spirit of inferior or previous enactments upon a subject which is not mentioned in the supreme law. A different construction would destroy a vested right in a portion of the citizens, and this no legislature has a right to do without compensation, and nothing can compensate a citizen for the loss of his or her suffrage--its value is equal to the value of life.

Neither can it be presumed that women are to be kept from the polls as a mere police regulation: it is to be hoped, at least, that police regulations in their case need not be very active.

The effect of the amendments to the Const.i.tution must be to annul the power over this subject in the States, whether past, present, or future, which is contrary to the amendments. The amendments would even arrest the action of the Supreme Court in cases pending before it prior to their adoption, and operate as an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any other jurisdiction than merely to dismiss the suit. 3 Dall., 382; 6 Wheaton, 405; 9 ib., 868; 3d Circ. Pa., 1832.

And if the restrictions contained in the Const.i.tution as to color, race or servitude, were designed to limit the State governments in reference to their own citizens, and were intended to operate also as restrictions on the federal power, and to prevent interference with the rights of the State and its citizens, how, then, can the State restrict citizens of the United States in the exercise of rights not mentioned in any restrictive clause in reference to actions on the part of those citizens having reference solely to the necessary functions of the General Government, such as the election of representatives and senators to Congress, whose election the Const.i.tution expressly gives Congress the power to regulate? S. C., 1847; Fox vs. Ohio, 5 Howard, 410.

Your memorialist complains of the existence of State laws, and prays Congress, by appropriate legislation, to declare them, as they are, annulled, and to give vitality to the Const.i.tution under its power to make and alter the regulations of the States contravening the same.

It may be urged in opposition that the courts have power, and should declare upon this subject. The Supreme Court has the power, and it would be its duty so to declare the law: but the court will not do so unless a determination of such point as shall arise make it necessary to the determination of a controversy, and hence a case must be presented in which there can be no rational doubt. All this would subject the aggrieved parties to much dilatory, expensive and needless litigation, which your memorialist prays your honorable body to dispense with by appropriate legislation, as there can be no purpose in special arguments "_ad inconvenienti_," enlarging or contracting the import of the language of the Const.i.tution.

_Therefore_, Believing firmly in the right of citizens to freely approach those in whose hands their destiny is placed under the Providence of G.o.d, your memorialist has frankly, but humbly, appealed to you, and prays that the wisdom of Congress may be moved to action in this matter for the benefit and the increased happiness of our beloved country.

SPEECH OF A. G. RIDDLE,

_In Support of the Woodhull Memorial, before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, as Reproduced in the Convention on the Evening of the same Day._

Mr. RIDDLE spoke as follows: Mr. _Chairman_--(Senator Nye)--I have always thought that the questions involved in this movement could be the more effectively presented by ladies; and I have never appeared in their public discussions unless by special request, and for some special purpose. I have been asked to bring to your notice as well as I may this evening the argument: That the women of these United States are full and complete citizens.

Citizens as fully, broadly, and deeply as it is possible for men to be, though not permitted to exercise the elective franchise.

As I arise I find between myself and this proposition, two or three questions, about which I am disposed to tax your patience for a moment, though there is nothing new to be said. In the outset, let me say that it is conceded by all, that the right of self-government, in America at any rate, is a natural right. You may select with care or at random, any one of the forty or fifty American const.i.tutions that have been prepared with more or less pains, and promulgated with solemnity, and you will find there is not one that has a.s.sumed to create and confer this right of self-government. But they all declare, expressly or impliedly, that the right to govern is inherent in the people. Now, if these ladies are a portion of the people, this right resides in them.

There is no new right to be conferred upon them. They are simply to go into the new exercise of an old franchise; for if the right of self-government is a natural right, then does it pertain to every human being alike. Such is the recognized theory of every American const.i.tution, and such is its practice.

Take a step further and you find that starting with a recognition of this pre-existing right of government, Const.i.tution makers have simply provided the means and machinery by which this right of government may work itself out. The only means placed in the hands of the individual citizen by which he may accomplish his portion of this great task is the ballot, or the _viva voce_ vote. If this right of self-government is a natural right, and if it can be exercised alone by the ballot, then is the right to the ballot a natural right, and he who stands up against this everlasting right of nature, had better look to it, and take himself out of the way. As this is a political question I may venture a single word to politicians. We of the masculine gender, are all of us, more or less politicians; and of all the timid things in the world the professed politician (a member of Congress excepted) is the most timid. [Laughter.] He is afraid of his soul, as if he had one, or one large enough to occasion apprehension. [Laughter.] I have this thing to say to them, that when any great idea or great truth finds itself at large in this lower world, and is obliged to get itself incorporated into the working processes of a government, if it does not find a political party ready, willing, and worthy to receive it, it forthwith makes for itself a new party. [Applause.] And as it does not create new human beings to form a party of, it must necessarily gather them from the old parties. Just as the distinguished Senator (Senator Nye) will recollect the present Republican party was formed, and against which the two old fossil parties united, as they always do. Now, this new great idea, if rejected, will disintegrate these old parties; take that which is fit, proper, and deserving for its own great mission, leaving the residuum to unite, and crumble and pulverize together under the feet of the new.

The right of self-government, as I have said, is a natural right pertaining to all alike, and is to be exercised by the ballot.

And the right to that is therefore a natural right, as is the right to wear clothes. Decency and comfort require that clothes should be worn; but they are artificial wholly. Just so is the right to vote a natural right, though the vote, or the mode of voting at least, is an artificial means. This logic can not be caviled with or gainsaid. The young man and the young woman outside of political considerations, in every other point of view, stand before the law on an equality, and what one may do, so may the other, each may govern him or herself. But not so politically; when the youth reaches the age of twenty-one the ballot comes to his hands by due course of law, protecting his natural right, he having grown to it. Why do you give him the ballot, pray, or permit him to take it for himself? Simply because it is the means by which he governs and protects himself.

n.o.body would start I suppose the terribly heterodox idea that it is not necessary for the young man to govern himself with the ballot. It would be one of those unheard-of atrocities that n.o.body would have the hardihood to promulgate in the presence of masculine a.s.sociates at all. He is ent.i.tled to the right for the purpose of governing himself. n.o.body was born to govern anybody else--man or woman. It is only because in political a.s.sociations people become so united, that a man in order to govern himself is obliged to govern others, that we get the right to govern others at all. It grows out of our effort to govern ourselves. As an essential necessity we are obliged to govern others and to be governed by them. This is our only warrant for the government of others.

Now, I pray to know why a young maiden, when she approaches the same age, may not have accorded to her the same protection of her natural right that is accorded to the youth, and for the same purpose. In the name of all womanhood, and of all manhood, I beg to know why this may not be so? In the name of my own daughters whose whispered words haunt the chambers of my soul, asking to know why, if it is necessary for their brother to exercise this right, it is not necessary for them? n.o.body need to argue to a father that his daughters are not the equals of his sons. I will never tolerate hearing it said, that my son is born to empire and sovereignty, while his sisters are born to be hidden away and yarded up in some solitary desert place, as their proper sphere.

[Applause.] I do not propose to raise and educate my daughters to keep them cooped up with their feet tied until some masculine purveyor comes along with his market basket.

Oh! ye opponents of the rights of woman, why not be consistent.

If, as you say, she has not the capacity to choose or exercise the elective franchise, why not choose for her in everything, and impose upon her the husband of your choice? Don't you represent her? You concede that the young woman has abundance of capacity to choose her lord and master to whom she shall be delivered, and yet she is not fit to vote for a constable. (Laughter.)

Be consistent, you who oppose us in this movement, and say she shall not have anything to do with the selection of her husband.

If she is competent at an early age, in the vortex and whirlpool of life, to select him to whom first, last, and always she shall belong, may she not once in four years have the privilege of voting for President without any great hazard? Think of it. Oh!

this terrible old question! We have been mining and drilling in the earth's crust, and we have got finally to the last question, or, rather, it has made its way to the surface. This question of woman's suffrage and woman's right at last comes up for final argument, and it will work its way along until it is definitely determined. Indeed, I believe it is already settled.

To return to these const.i.tutions, from which I mean not to wander again. I said to you that these const.i.tutions of the various American States have recognized as older than themselves the right of government. They have furnished the means, which were also older than themselves, the exercise of the elective franchise. They have not attempted to create and confer any right to govern. They simply regulate it; and they are framed upon this idea, that all people are equally ent.i.tled to govern themselves, women and men, and would all govern themselves if some were not excluded by the terms and provisions of these, their const.i.tutions. Take up the whole thirty-five that can be found in the edition of 1864, and every one of them says that the elective franchise shall be exercised by the _male_ white citizens. We have got rid of the "white." We have finally given color to the Const.i.tution. (Laughter.) And, in getting rid of that "white," we got rid of more than was probably intended at the time. Good does get itself done by accident sometimes. It has to when bad men do it. (Laughter and applause.) Why is this term "male" used in the const.i.tutions, pray? It was not by accident. Forty or fifty of them would not use it, except by design. It was because every mortal man knew when tinkering up a const.i.tution that if he did not put male in, females would vote. They had the right, and there had to be a const.i.tutional barrier erected to prevent their exercise of it. Now, the thing which we have to do is either to strike out this term "male," which, I trust, ladies (turning to the ladies on the platform), is not particularly odious anywhere else, except in the const.i.tution.

Mrs. DAVIS and others--Not at all.

Mr. RIDDLE.--I repeat, that what we have to do is either to get rid of this word "male," or to convince Congress, the courts, and the rest of the world, that it is already gotten rid of, which, I think, is easier. If it remains it can be put out in a very summary way. It makes no difference in how many const.i.tutions it is found, nor in how many carefully considered statutes it has been incorporated, for a single provision in the Const.i.tution of the United States is of that potency that instantaneously all const.i.tutions and all statutes are clarified of the exclusive "male" principle, and that without other change or repeal.

And this brings me to the immediate question to be discussed, the XIV. Amendment of the Const.i.tution, which stands as the XIV.

Article. And you will understand that when the people or the legislature speak by const.i.tution or law, and use ordinary language, that they mean what they say, and n.o.body can get up and say they do not mean that, or that they mean something else.

There is n.o.body that can be heard for a moment to argue against the plain, obvious, declared, well-ascertained meaning of words.

And when such words are used, it is the end of argument and of construction. The great object to be achieved, so far as women are concerned, is to bring them into the possession of the rights of citizens.h.i.+p. "A person" is one thing, and naturally, "a citizen" is something a little more. He or she is the creature of a political compact, having the rights, the privileges, the franchises of that particular political a.s.sociation, whatever they are. A very ingenious, and at the same time a very meritorious writer, recently, in overhauling these English words--and it is a pretty good thing my honorable friends from the two Houses of Congress are not to be referred to--but it is a good thing for the rest of us who use words sometimes carelessly, to see how Mr. Grant White says some of them should be used, and what they really do mean. On page 100 of his recent work on "Words and their Uses," which, so far as I know, has received the highest commendation of the critics--in speaking of this term "citizen," and how it is used, or rather how it is misused, says:

Citizen is used by some newspaper writers with what seems like an affectation of the French usage of _citoyen_ in the First Republic. For instance, "Gen. A. is a well-known citizen." "Several citizens carried the sufferer," etc. The writer might as well have said that the sufferer was carried off by several church members or several "Freemasons." Now mark, he says, that "a citizen is a person who has certain political rights, and the word is properly used only to imply or suggest the possession of those rights."

That is what we should use the term "citizen" for--apply it to a naturalized person in possession of certain political franchises, rights, and privileges. Thanking Mr. Grant White for that, let us, in its light, read the first clause of the XIV. Amendment, and see what it does say and mean. "Sec. 1st. All persons;" not all male persons, nor all white persons, but "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, subject to the jurisdiction thereof, _are citizens_ of the United States, and of the States where they reside." That is what they are. They are citizens.

That is, "persons," are "citizens," which means naturalized persons, clothed and permeated with, surrounded by, and put in possession of, citizens.h.i.+p. The term is used in the sense in which Mr. White uses it. It is no new meaning; no new use of the word.

Now turn to Webster's Unabridged, where citizen is defined: "Citizen--a person," [in the United States,]--for he inserts in brackets the expressive "U. S." to indicate what he means,--"native or naturalized, who has the privilege of voting for public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people."

Worcester says of "citizen":--"An inhabitant of a Republic who enjoys the rights of a citizen or freeman, and who has a right to vote for public officers, as a citizen of the United States."

Turn to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, in orthodox sheep skin, and see what he says a citizen is: "Citizen, one who, under the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States has a right to vote for representatives in Congress and other public offices, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people."--4th ed., vol. 1, p. 221.

All known authority concurs in establis.h.i.+ng this as the sole, proper signification of the word citizen; and in this sense, and in no other, is it used in the XIV. Amendment. I know that the term is sometimes used--is once used, perhaps, in the Const.i.tution--to correspond somewhat with the term "inhabitant,"

as thus, "citizens of different States may sue each other in the courts of the United States," etc. But it was not necessary to shake the foundations of this great Republic, to formulate and get adopted this new amendment, for the purpose of stating that the people who were born and always had lived in the United States might be inhabitants of them. But it was necessary to say so, that cavaliers might be estopped from denying that they are citizens.

But to recur to the further clause of this XIV. Amendment. Let us see, now, really what the makers and promulgators of it did mean.

"No State shall make or enforce any law"--neither make any new law, nor enforce any that had already been made--"which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Is there any doubt now as to what "citizen" means? He, or she, or both, are persons in possession, and have by express declaration all the privileges and the immunities of citizens.

When I stated this before the Judiciary Committee this morning, a distinguished Representative from Illinois, and a very able lawyer, stopped me and said, "Mr. Riddle, babies would be citizens according to that, and would have the privilege of going straight to the ballot-box, the first thing." (Laughter.) Perhaps so; but I could not see it then, and can not see it now. All power is inherent in the people, and it is perfectly competent for this "all power" to declare at what age and under what circ.u.mstances the citizen shall vote; so that the rule applies uniformly, and excludes none. One-half of the people were excluded, and this article removes that exclusion--and that is all. Apply the gentleman's idea to other provisions of the Const.i.tution; for instance, to this: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Would he contend that therefore every new-born baby might at once grasp a musket? This might be const.i.tutional, but it would put the infantry on a war-footing before the commissariat could be mobilized, I fear.

(Laughter and applause.)

Women are not only citizens, but the amendment further says, that no State shall pa.s.s any law or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of this citizens.h.i.+p. The privileges--not a part of them. What do we mean when we say the privileges? For instance, when we say "the ladies," do we not mean them all? "The Senators," we mean them all. We do not merely mean the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Nye), however he may have the right to be spoken of first. (Laughter and applause.) These terms, "privileges and immunities," are not now used for the first time in the American Const.i.tution. They are old acquaintances of ours. They have done service a great while. They occur in this same Const.i.tution, as will be seen by referring to the second section of Article IV, on page 38 of Paschal's admirably annotated Const.i.tution of the United States: "Citizens of each State shall be ent.i.tled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." Precisely, as the XIV. Amendment has it, but, as Judge Bradley recently said, with a much more enlarged meaning in the latter. They were old before the Const.i.tution, and were incorporated into it from the fourth article of the Old Confederation, which provided, "that the free inhabitants of each of the States shall be ent.i.tled to all the privileges and immunities of the free citizens of the several States."

If you would see a comment upon these terms, read the forty-second number of the _Federalist_, or a tumefied and diluted edition of it, in Story on the Const.i.tution, which, like some other of his books, contains some remarks of his own, and are not always the best things in them. For the benefit of the Judiciary Committee, made up, as you know, of some of the ablest lawyers and best men of the country, I procured a judicial definition of these terms, "privileges, and immunities," although Mr. Attorney Bates said none exists, and my friend Judge Paschal, a more learned man, repeated it. I referred them to the case of Corfield _vs._ Coryell, 4th vol. of the so-called "Was.h.i.+ngton Circuit Court Reports," p. 371, where these terms came up, away back in the old time. Bushrod Was.h.i.+ngton, the favorite nephew of our Was.h.i.+ngton, made the decision, ladies. He was the Was.h.i.+ngton who got all of the brains of the family outside of its great chief; and he put them to a most admirable use. He was one of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, and he judicially defined the meaning of these "privileges and immunities," and said that they included such privileges as are fundamental in their nature. And among them he says, is the right to EXERCISE THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE, and to HOLD OFFICES, as provided for by the laws of the various States. And the great Chancellor Kent, quoting this case, thus approvingly incorporates its very language into his text, where it stands unchallenged, unquestioned, and uncontradicted.

"It was declared in Corfield _vs._ Coryell, that the privileges and immunities conceded by the Const.i.tution of the United States to citizens in the several States, were to be confined to those which were in their nature fundamental, and belonged of right to the citizens of all free governments. Such are the rights of protection of life and liberty, and to acquire and enjoy property, and to pay no higher impositions than other citizens, and to pa.s.s through or reside in the State at pleasure, and _to enjoy the elective franchise according_ to the regulations of the law of the State" (2 Kent Com., p. 71).

Why, the gentlemen of the Upper and of the Lower House, who are familiar with that decision and with its canonization by Kent, are not obliged to resort to Webster (not Daniel) and Worcester, nor to Grant White, nor even to Bouvier's Law Dictionary. They may overrule them all if they will. But they must go back to these sometimes forgotten decisions, which rest in the leaves of these dusty volumes, to these witnesses of the law, who declare that these expressions, "privileges, and immunities" include the elective franchise. And the whole people of these United States have solemnly declared "that all persons are citizens, and no State shall make or enforce any law to abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens." If such authority and such reasoning were presented to a court on the trial of any other case in the wide world, save that of women and their rights, an advocate would be stopped by the court before he had gone half the length I have in this argument. The court would say that they would hear from the other side. (Laughter.) But this thing of opposition to woman's rights does not rest in intelligence so that it can be grasped in argument. It has no intellectual foundation anywhere.

No logic supports it. No reason or argument sustains it. It rests upon no foundation of the human understanding; hence, it can not be combated; for, as Mr. Mills says, the worse it is beaten in argument the stronger it is fortified in prejudice. Men seem to think that inasmuch as this thing has always been, somehow or other, in some way or other, there was somewhere, at some time some reason for it, which could be shown now if somebody could only think of it or find it; but, of course, n.o.body ever did and n.o.body ever will. There never was any.

(Laughter.)

One consideration alone is absolutely conclusive of this argument, and from it escape is impossible. "Persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," were already in the full and complete enjoyment of every privilege and immunity known to our political system, except the elective franchise and its correlative, the right to hold office. The only difference between the naturalized and unnaturalized individual is this right of voting. I pray our opponents to tell us then what is conferred by this first section of this wonderful article, if it be not these rights? Nothing else remained that it could confer; and this view alone silences cavil, even. If this section does not confer or guarantee the exercise of the elective franchise, then at infinite pains have we mined among the foundations of our marvelous structure, and have deposited there as one of them an utter sham, full of the emptiness of nothing. Let him escape this who may.

If there can still remain a question of doubt about this, I beg the attention of the doubters to the further words of the Const.i.tution, to be found in the XV. Amendment. And here I am met with the apt inquiry, "Why, Mr. Riddle, if women are a part of 'all persons,' colored men are also a part of the same 'all persons,' and if women are made citizens and clothed with the immunities and privileges of citizens.h.i.+p by the XIV. Amendment, so were colored men; why, then, was it necessary to enact the XV.

Amendment? This fact is fatal to your argument." Well, there was no necessity for it. It was a stupid piece of business, very stupid, and when we recover the lost art of blus.h.i.+ng, some faces will color when that XV. Amendment is recalled. But it does us this good service; it settles the construction of this XIV.

Amendment, as we contend for it, beyond all cavil. The general impression is, that the XV. Amendment confers the elective franchise upon the colored man. If it does not, then our opposers must give it up, for colored men rightfully vote. What does this article say? That the elective franchise is conferred upon persons of African descent, or those who have suffered from a previous condition of servitude? Not a word of it. It does say: "The right of citizens"--not the right of persons of African descent--"the right of citizens of the United States to vote, shall not be denied." That is what it says--"Shall not be denied or abridged, by the United States or by the several States." That does not confer suffrage; _it recognizes a right already conferred_, and says that it shall not be denied or abridged. A gentleman of the committee this morning took the ground that this amendment granted the franchise because it declares that the right to it shall not be denied! This is in effect that when a thing can not be denied, the lack of power to deny it creates it.

(Laughter.) I confess I could not see it. (Laughter.) I have thought of it since, and I do not see it now. "Shall not be denied or _abridged_." How can you abridge a thing that does not exist? And would the gentleman also contend that a lack of power to cut off a thing not in existence also creates the thing? This XV. Article then treats the right of the citizen to vote as already existing, and it specifies cla.s.ses, as persons of color, of certain race, and of previous servitude, as especially having the right to vote.

Where, when, and how did they get it? Was it by virtue of the XIV. Amendment? If so, it was because they were a part of the "all persons" named in it, of whom women are also a much larger and much more important part. So, past cavil, if the African received this franchise by the XIV. Article, then did women also receive it, and more abundantly! If you go back to the starting point of American politics, and say that the right is inherent in the colored man, then by the law of nature it is inherent in woman. I do not care which of these formulas you adopt. Not at all. In either event it is recognized as existing in a citizen of the United States. But my learned and subtle friend from Illinois said to me to-day, "Why, don't you see, Mr. Riddle, that they have limited the franchise in this XV. Amendment, so that it shall not be denied in the case of persons of color, and of a certain race, and previous condition of servitude, and does that not permit the States to deny it in other cases?" Well, the XV.

Amendment alone would, perhaps, under the artificial rules of law, but I referred the gentleman immediately, as I refer you now, back to the XIV. Amendment where the right is conferred, and where in its great, broad, sweeping language it is declared that no State shall either enact or enforce any law that abridges the privileges and immunities of any citizen.

The XV. Amendment in no way changes the XIV., nor does it add an iota to the privileges and immunities of the citizen. It could not. It reiterates for the benefit of these cla.s.ses the declaration of the XIV.; and as that declares that no State shall deny the rights of the citizen, this adds to the list the United States, and its real force is spent in conferring upon Congress power to legislate in favor of the cla.s.ses named in it, a power not granted by the XIV. Well, really, this must be the end of the argument. And I repeat, you find the XIV. Amendment declares that all persons are citizens; that they have the privilege and immunities of citizens, and the XV. declares that among the privileges and immunities of citizens is the right to suffrage, because it says in words that that shall not be denied, though men do deny it. How is the XV. Amendment declaring that it shall not be denied on account of either race, color, or previous condition of servitude, to be regarded? It spends its force in these two things. The XIV. Amendment only denied the power to the several States to abridge the privileges of citizens.h.i.+p. The XV.

Amendment goes further, and says that neither any State nor the United States shall do it, using the term "deny" with the term "abrogate" of the other. It goes further; for the purposes of these three conditions it confers express power upon Congress to legislate, while the XIV. Amendment does not. But there is just one little thing further that I drop for the henpecked to pick at. There are three cla.s.ses whose right to vote shall not be denied according to the XV. Amendment--persons of color, persons on account of race, and persons who have suffered from previous condition of servitude. Now, ladies, what is really the legal status of marriage, so far as the condition of the wife is concerned?

SUSAN B. ANTHONY.--One of servitude, and of the hardest kind, and just for board and clothes, at that, too. (Laughter and applause.)

Mr. RIDDLE.--And they frequently have to make and pay for their clothes, and board themselves--(renewed laughter)--and not only themselves, but board also the lord and master, who calls himself the head of the family. But that is not all of it. It is not cant; it is not popular phraseology, but it is the language of the law. The condition of the married woman is that of servitude.

The law calls her husband "baron," and she is simply a woman--"feme." The law gives her to the man, not the man to her, nor the two mutually to each other. They become one, and that one is the husband--such as he is. Her name is blotted out from the living, or at best it is appended to that of the husband. She belongs to her master; all that she has belongs to him. All that she earns is his, because she is his. If she does anything that binds him, it is simply as his servant. If she makes a contract that is binding even upon herself, it is because he consents to it. She does not own anything; she does not own the children that are born of her. The husband exclusively controls them while living, and by his will he may, and often does, bequeath to somebody else the custody and care of them after his death. And the law which we men make enforces all this to-day. I trust that most of us are a great deal better than the law. If the wife of a man should suffer by an accident on a railroad, and suit should be brought to recover against the company for injury to her person, the suit brought by the husband would be upon the ground that his wife was his servant, and he had lost her service. If he did not, he could not recover.

Mrs. STANTON.--Is such the law in case of a daughter?