The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution
Chapter 61 : London, April 22d, 1779.My Dear Friend, The bearer of this, and some other papers, is a

London, April 22d, 1779.

My Dear Friend,

The bearer of this, and some other papers, is a very sensible and worthy gentleman, with whom I had the pleasure of contracting an acquaintance since the commencement of the American troubles, originally upon the business of the American prisoners. It is a satisfaction to me at all times to have found him a friend to the restoration of peace between the two countries. It has likewise been an additional satisfaction and confirmation to me in my own thoughts upon that subject, to find that his sentiments, I think upon most, or all of the subjects upon which we have conversed, have coincided with mine. We both seem possessed of the opinion, that some plan of opening a negotiation upon preliminaries, which each side might find to be a sufficient security to itself, might be practicable; and then your sentiment, which you gave me in a letter some years ago, might have its free scope and effect, viz, _A little time given for cooling might have excellent effects_.

The sentiments I have opened to you in my late letters for some months past, and which I have reduced in an enclosed paper into a more specific shape, seem to me, upon very repeated reflection, to promise the fairest ground of good expectation. These propositions originate from myself, as a mediator; I have communications with both sides, but certainly no authority to make proposals from either; and perhaps neither side, if I were to make the propositions separately to each, (being myself unauthorised) might give me positive consent. Each side separately might say, No, from what is called political prudence; and yet each side might secretly wish that the offer could be made, with a _done first_, from the other party. I think the proposition of a truce for five or seven years, leaving all things in the present dispute _in status quo_, must be advantageous to all parties, if it were only in consideration that a general satisfactory peace to all parties _may_ come among the _excellent effects of time given for cooling_. We can but fight it out at last. War never comes too late; wisdom may step in between. These matters have stolen upon us, and have arisen to great and formidable consequences, from small and unexpected beginnings; but henceforward, we should know by experience what to expect. If the rage of war could but be abated for a sufficient length of time for reason and reflection to operate, I think it would never revive. I cannot pretend to forecast the result of any negotiation, but I think war would not revive; which is all that I want for my argument. Peace is a _bonum in se_; whereas the most favorable events of war are but relatively lesser evils; certainly they are evils; _mala in se_, not _bona in se_.

I hope that a cessation of hostilities would produce a renewal of reflection; but even to take the argument at the worst advantage, the two parties are at a cooling distance of three thousand miles asunder.

If the flames of war could be but once extinguished, does not the Atlantic ocean contain cold water enough to prevent them bursting out again? I am very strongly of opinion that the two nations of Great Britain and North America, would accord to the proposition of a truce _for cooling_. I cannot say whether a British ministry would accord to it, because they will not tell me; nor can I say whether an American Plenipotentiary would accord to it, because, probably, you will not tell me. I put myself into your hands, however, when I tell you frankly, I am of opinion that both would accord to it, if there could be a _done first_ on either side, to bind the bargain fast. You have the odds of me in this matter, because you know one half of the question; and I cannot give you any proof on the other side, but only my own presumptive judgment upon observation, and upon a course of reasoning in my own thoughts.

But for France. My judgment would be, that if the proposition of the proposed preliminaries should be agreeable to America, France would do very unhandsomely to defeat it by their refusal. I likewise think it the interest of France, because their interest leads them to go to a certain point, and no further. There is a disparity in the operation of the terms of the alliance on the part of France, and on the part of America. The more vigorously France interposes, the better for America; in proportion to their exertions, they create, less or more, a diversion of the British force; this reasoning goes straight forward for America; but it is not so with France. There is a certain point to France, beyond which their work would fail, and recoil upon themselves; if they were to drive the British Ministry totally to abandon the American war, it would become totally a French war. The events of a twelvemonth past seem to bear testimony to this course of reasoning. The disadvantage upon the bargain to America is, that the efficacy of the French alliance to them presupposes their continuance in the war. The demur to France is, that the liberation of their new ally recoils with double weight of the war upon themselves, without any ulterior points of advantage in view, as dependent upon that alliance. I think the interest of all parties coincides with the proposition of preliminaries.

The proposed preliminaries appear to me to be just and equitable to all parties; but the great object with me is to come to some preliminaries. I could almost add, whatever those preliminaries might be, provided a suspension of arms for an adequate term of years were one, I think it would be ten thousand to one against any future renewal of the war. It is not necessary to enter at large into the reasons which induce me to think, that the British Ministry, as well as the American Plenipotentiary, would consent to the terms of the proposed preliminaries; for indeed I do not know that I am founded in that opinion with respect to either, but still I believe it of both.

But what can a private person do in such a case, wis.h.i.+ng to be a mediator for peace, having access to both parties, but equally uncertain of the reception of his mediation on either side? I must hesitate to take any public step, as by a proposition in Parliament, or by any other means to drive the parties to an explanation upon any specific proposals; and yet I am very unwilling to let the session pa.s.s without some proposition, upon which the parties may meet, if they should be so inclined, as I suspect them to be. I have been endeavoring to feel pulses for some months, but all is dumb show. I cannot say that I meet with anything discouraging, to my apprehension, either as to equitableness or practicability of the proposition for preliminaries. If I could but simply receive sufficient encouragement, that I should not run any hazard of obstructing any other practicable propositions by obtruding mine, I should be very much satisfied to come forward in that case with mine, to furnish a beginning at least, which might lead to peace.

There is nothing that I wish so much as to have an opportunity of seeing and conversing with you, having many things to say to you; but if that cannot yet happen, I have only to say, that whatever communication you may think proper to make to me, which may lead to peace, you may be a.s.sured that I shall be most strenuous in applying it to that end. In all cases of difficulty in human life, there must be confidence somewhere, to enable us to extricate nations from the evils attendant upon national disputes, as they arise out of national pa.s.sions, jealousies, and points of honor. I am not sure whether the extreme caution and diffidence of persons in political life be not the cause, almost as frequently, of the unnecessary protraction of the miseries of war, as of the final production of any superior good to any State. Peace now is better than peace a twelvemonth hence, at least by all the lives that may be lost in the meanwhile, and by all the acc.u.mulated miseries that may intervene by that delay. When I speak of the necessity of confidence, I would not have you to think, that I trust to all professions, promiscuously, with confidence; my thoughts are free respecting all parties; and for myself, if I thought it necessary for the end of attaining any additional confidence in your esteem, to enable me to co-operate the more effectually towards the restoration of peace, there is nothing that I would wish you to be a.s.sured of but this; that no fallacious offers of insincerity, nor any pretexts for covering secret designs, or for obtaining unfair advantages, shall ever pa.s.s through my hands.

Believe me truly to be, not only a lover of my country, but a sincere friend to peace and to the rights of mankind; and ever most affectionately yours.

D. HARTLEY.

_Observations by Mr Hartley._

Lord North consented to Mr Hartley's proposition, for endeavoring to procure from the American Plenipotentiary or Plenipotentiaries some opening, that they would be willing to commence a parley, on propositions of peace between Great Britain and America; and supposed the terms, which Mr Hartley had in view, would be something like a tacit cession of independence to America, with a truce for a certain term of years, to serve as a basis for a general treaty of accommodation and final settlement.

This last application (which was made on the 20th of April, 1779) of Mr Hartley to Lord North, after several previous conferences on the subject, is the ground of the present confidential communication with Dr Franklin, on the part of Mr Hartley, who states to Dr Franklin, as he did to Lord North, that an auspicious beginning of a negotiation is _dimidium facti_.

Mr Hartley's ideas of the probable course of the negotiation would be to the following effect;

1. Five Commissioners (or any three of them) to be appointed on the part of His Britannic Majesty to treat, consult, and agree upon the final settlement and pacification of the present troubles, upon safe, honorable, and permanent terms, subject to ratification by Parliament.

2. That any one of the aforesaid Commissioners may be empowered to agree, as a preliminary, to a suspension of hostilities by sea and land, for a certain term of five or seven years.

3. That any one of the aforesaid Commissioners be empowered to agree, as a second preliminary, to suspend the operation and effect of any and all acts of Parliament respecting America, for a certain term of five or seven years.

4. That it is expected, as a third preliminary, that America should be released, free and unengaged, from any treaties with foreign powers, which may tend to embarra.s.s or defeat the present proposed negotiation.

5. That a general treaty for negotiation shall be set on foot as soon as may be, after the agreement of the foregoing preliminaries.

_N. B._ A doubt seeming to arise from Lord North, relative to the probability of any explanatory communication on the part of Dr Franklin, Mr Hartley expressed, he thought it possible, that as a known friend to peace, he might be considered by Dr Franklin as a depot of any communications, which may serve from time to time to facilitate the terms of peace; which therefore prevents this communication from being considered as any direct overture from Lord North to Dr Franklin, or from Dr Franklin to Lord North; but as it is merely a mediatorial proposition of Mr Hartley, as a private person, for the purpose of bringing the parties to a parley.

INSTRUCTIONS

_To John Paul Jones, Commander of the American Squadron in the Service of the United States, now in the Port of L'Orient._

1st. His Majesty, having been pleased to grant some troops for a particular expedition, proposed to annoy our common enemy, in which the sea-force under your command might have an opportunity of distinguis.h.i.+ng itself, you are to receive on board the s.h.i.+ps of war, and the other vessels destined for that purpose, the troops that shall present themselves to you, afford them such accommodation as may be most proper for preserving their health, and convey them to such port or place as their commander shall desire to land them at.

2dly. When the troops are landed, you are to aid, by all means in your power, their operations, as they will be instructed in like manner to aid and support those you may make with your s.h.i.+ps, that so by this concurrence and union of your different forces, all that such a compounded strength is capable of may be effected.

3dly. You are during the expedition never to depart from the troops, so as not to be able to protect them in case of a repulse, and in all events you are to endeavor to effect their complete re-embarkation on board the s.h.i.+ps and transports under your command, when the expedition shall be ended.

4thly. You are to bring to France all the English seamen you may happen to take prisoners, in order to complete the good work you have already made such progress in, of delivering by an exchange the rest of our countrymen now languis.h.i.+ng in the gaols of Great Britain.

5thly. As many of your officers and people have lately escaped from English prisons, either in Europe or America, you are to be particularly attentive to their conduct towards the prisoners, which the fortune of war may throw into your hands, lest resentment of the more than barbarous usage by the English in many places towards the Americans should occasion a retaliation, and an imitation of what ought rather to be detested and avoided, for the sake of humanity and for the honor of our country.

6thly. In the same view, although the English have burnt wantonly many defenceless towns in America, you are not to follow this example, unless where a reasonable ransom is refused, in which case your own generous feelings, as well as this instruction, will induce you to give timely notice of your intention, that sick and ancient persons, women, and children may be first removed.

Done at Pa.s.sy, this 28th day of April, 1779.

B. FRANKLIN,

_Minister Plenipotentiary from the United_ _States to the Court of France_.

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

Pa.s.sy, May 4th, 1779.

Dear Sir,

I received your several favors, viz. one of April the 10th, one of the 20th, and two of the 22d, all on the same day, but by different conveyances.

I need not repeat, what we have each of us so often repeated, the wish for peace. I will begin, by frankly a.s.suring you, that though I think a direct, immediate peace, the best mode of present accommodation for Britain, as well as for America, yet if that _is not_ at this time practicable, and a truce is practicable, I should not be against a truce; but this is merely on motives of _general humanity_, to obviate the evils men devilishly inflict on men in time of war, and to lessen as much as possible the similarity of earth and h.e.l.l. For with regard to particular advantages, respecting the States I am connected with, I am persuaded it is theirs to continue the war, till England shall be reduced to that perfect impotence of mischief, which alone can prevail with her to let other nations enjoy, "_Peace, Liberty, and Safety_." I think, however, that a _short_ truce, which must, therefore, be an _armed_ truce, and put all parties to an almost equal expense with a continued war, is by no means desirable.

But this proposition of a truce, if made at all, should be made to France at the same time it is made to America. They have each of them too much honor, as well as too much sense, to listen separately to any propositions, which tend to separate them from each other.

I will now give you my thoughts on your ideas of a negotiation, in the order you have placed them. If you will number them in your copy, you will readily see to which my observations refer, and I may therefore be more concise.

_To the 1st_,--I do not see the necessity or use of five Commissioners. A number of talkers lengthens discussions, and often embarra.s.ses instead of aiding a settlement. Their different particular views, private interests, and jealousies of each other, are likewise so many rubs in the way, and it sometimes happens, that a number cannot agree to what each privately thinks reasonable, and would have agreed to, or perhaps proposed, if alone. But this as the parties please.

_To the 2d_,--The term of twentyone years would be better for all sides. The suspension of hostilities should be expressed to be between all parties at war; and that the British troops and s.h.i.+ps of war now in any of the United States be withdrawn.

_To the 3d_,--This seems needless, and is a thing that may be done or omitted as you please; America has no concern about those acts of parliament.

_To the 4th_,--The reason of proposing this is not understood, nor the use of it, nor what inducement there can be for us to agree to it.

When you come to treat with both your enemies, you may negotiate away as much of these engagements as you can; but powers, who have made a firm solid league, evidently useful to both, can never be prevailed with to dissolve it, for the vague expectation of another _in nubibus_; nor even on the certainty, that another will be proposed, without knowing what are to be its articles. America has no desire of being free from her engagements to France. The chief is, that of continuing the war in conjunction with her, and not making a separate peace; and this is an obligation not in the power of America to dissolve, being an obligation of _grat.i.tude and justice_ towards a nation, which is engaged in a war on her account, and for her protection; and would be forever binding, whether such an article existed or not in the treaty; and though it did not exist, an honest American would cut off his right hand, rather than sign an agreement with England contrary to the spirit of it.

_To the 5th_,--As soon as you please.

If you had mentioned France in your proposed suspension of arms, I should have immediately shown it to the Minister, and have endeavored to support that idea. As it stands, I am in doubt whether I shall communicate your paper or not, though by your writing it is so fair it seems as if you intended it. If I do, I shall acquaint you with the result.

The bill, of which you send me a copy, was an excellent one at the time, and might have had great and good effects, if, instead of telling us haughtily, that our humble pet.i.tion should receive no answer, the Ministry had received and enacted that bill into a law. It might have erected a wall of bra.s.s round England, if such a measure had been adopted, when Friar Bacon's brazen head cried out, TIME IS!