The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution
Chapter 264 : I am quite of Mr Hartley's mind, that the Dutch will profit by all the English bl

I am quite of Mr Hartley's mind, that the Dutch will profit by all the English blunders in regulating the West India trade, and am happy that M. Van Berckel will be soon with Congress, when its members and Ministers may communicate through him anything they wish to their High Mightinesses. They may inquire of him what are the rights of the East and West India Companies? To what an extent our vessels may be admitted to Surinam, Curacoa, Demerara, Essequibo, Berbice, St Eustatia? What we may be allowed to carry there? and what bring from thence to the United States, or to Europe? Whether we may carry sugars, &c. to Amsterdam, Rotterdam, &c.? There are at Rotterdam and Amsterdam one hundred and twentyseven or eight refineries of sugar.

How far these may be affected, &c.?

I lay it down for a rule, that the nation which shall allow us the most perfect liberty to trade with her Colonies, whether it be France, England, Spain, or Holland, will see her Colonies flourish above all others, and will draw proportionally our trade to themselves; and I rely upon it, the Dutch will have sagacity to see it, and as they are more attentive to mercantile profit, than to a military marine, I have great hopes from their friends.h.i.+p. As there will be an interval before the signature of the definitive treaty, I propose a journey of three weeks, to Amsterdam and the Hague, in hopes of learning in more detail the intentions of the Dutch in this respect. I am in hopes too of encouraging the loan to a.s.sist our Superintendent of Finance. The Dutch may be a great resource to us in finance and commerce. I wish that cargoes of produce may be hastened to Amsterdam to Messrs Willinks & Co. for this will give vigor to the loan, and all the money we can prevent England and the two Empires from obtaining in Holland, will not only be nerves for us, but, perhaps, be useful too to France in her negotiations.

I have spent the whole forenoon in conversation with the Duc de la Vauguyon. He thinks that England wishes to revive her trade to the Levant, to Smyrna, Aleppo, &c. and her carrying trade in Italy; and although she might be pleased to see France involved in a war with the Emperor and Empress, yet he thinks her funds are not in a condition to afford subsidies to either, and, therefore, that she will be perfectly neutral. Quere, however, whether if by a subsidy or a loan of a million or two a year, she could make France spend eight or ten millions, she would not strive hard to do it? The Duke thinks, that France will proceed softly, and endeavor, if possible, to avert the furious storm that threatens, and to compose the disputes of the three Empires, if possible; but she will never suffer such a usurpation as the conquest of the Turkish Provinces in Europe. France will certainly defend Constantinople. He thinks that the Empress of Russia has not revenues, and cannot get cash to march and subsist vast armies, and to transport great fleets, and that the Emperor has not revenues to support a long war.

This is, however, a serious business, and France lays it so much to heart, and looks upon the chance of her being obliged to arm, as so probable, that I presume this to be the princ.i.p.al motive of her refusal to lend us two or three millions of livres more.

As to our West India questions, the Duke a.s.sures me, that the French Ministry, particularly the Count de Vergennes, are determined to do everything they can consistent with their own essential interests, to favor and promote the friends.h.i.+p and commerce between their country and ours. That they, especially the Count, are declared enemies of the French fiscal system, which is certainly the most ruinous to their commerce, and intend to do everything they can to make alterations to favor commerce; but no change can be made in this, without affecting their revenues, and making voids, failures, and deficiencies, which they cannot fill up. They must, therefore, proceed softly. That France would favor the commerce between Portugal and America, because it would tend to draw off that kingdom from her dependence on England.

That England, by her commercial treaty with the Portuguese, in 1703, has turned them into an English Colony, made them entirely dependent, and secured a commerce with them of three millions value. France would be glad to see this, or as much of it as possible, turned to America.

The Duke agrees fully with me in the maxim, that those Colonies will grow the most in wealth, improvement, population, and every sort of prosperity, which are allowed the freest communication with us, and that we shall be allowed to carry lumber, fish, and live stock, to their islands, but that the export of their sugars to us, he thinks, must be in their own s.h.i.+ps, because they are afraid of our becoming the carriers of all their commerce, because they know and say, that we can do it cheaper than they can. These sentiments are different from those, which he mentioned to me a few days ago, when he said, the West India trade with us must be carried on in French bottoms.

The Duke said, the English had been trying to deceive us, but were now developing their true sentiments. They pretended, for awhile, to abolish the navigation act and all distinctions, to make one people with us again, to be friends, brothers, &c. in hopes of drawing us off from France, but not finding success, they were now showing their true plan. As to the pretended system of Shelburne, of a universal free commerce, although he thought it would be for the good of mankind in general, yet, for an English Minister, it was the plan of a madman, for it would be the ruin of that nation. He did not think Shelburne was sincere in it; he only meant an illusion to us. Here I differ from the Duke, and believe, that the late Ministry were very sincere towards us, and would have made a treaty with us, at least to revive the universal trade between us, upon a liberal plan. This doctrine of ruin, from that plan, to the English, has been so much preached of late in England by the French and the American refugees, who aim at establishments in Canada and Nova Scotia, and by the old Butean administration and their partisans, that I do not know whether any Ministry could now support a generous plan. But if Temple, Thurlow, Shelburne, Pitt, &c. should come in, I should not despair of it. It is true, the Shelburne administration did encourage the ideas of cordial, perfect friends.h.i.+p, of entire reconciliation of affections, of making no distinction between their people and ours, especially between the inhabitants of Canada and Nova Scotia and us, and this, with the professed purpose of destroying all seeds of war between us. These sentiments were freely uttered by Fitzherbert, Oswald, Whiteford, Vaughan, and all who had the confidence of that Ministry; and in these sentiments they were, I believe, very sincere. And they are, indeed, the only means of preventing a future war between us and them, and so sure as they depart from that plan, so sure, in less than fifteen years, perhaps less than seven, there will break out another war.

Quarrels will arise among fishermen, between inhabitants of Canada and Nova Scotia and us, and between their people and ours in the West Indies, in our ports, and in the ports of the three kingdoms, which will breed a war in spite of all we can do to prevent it. France sees this and rejoices in it, and I know not whether we ought to be sorry; yet I think we ought to make it a maxim to avoid all wars, if possible; and to take care that it is not our fault if we cannot. We ought to do everything, which the English will concur in, to remove all causes of jealousies, and kill all the seeds of hostility as effectually as we can; and to be upon our guard to prevent the French, Spaniards, and Dutch, from sowing the seeds of war between us, for we may rely upon it they will do it if they can.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, July 18th, 1783.

Sir,

There is cause to be solicitous about the state of things in England.

The present Ministry swerve more and more from the true system, for the prosperity of their country and ours. Mr Hartley, whose sentiments are at bottom just, is probably kept here, if he was not sent at first, merely to amuse us, and to keep him out of the way of embarra.s.sing the coalition. We need not fear, that France and England will make a common cause against us, even in relation to the carrying-trade to and from the West Indies. Although they may mutually inspire into each other false notions of their interests at times, yet there can never be a concert of operations between them. Mutual enmity is bred in the blood and bones of both, and rivals and enemies at heart they eternally will be.

In order to induce both to allow us our natural right to the carrying-trade, we must negotiate with the Dutch, Danes, Portuguese, and even with the Empires; for the more friends and resources we have, the more we shall be respected by the French and English; and the more freedom of trade we enjoy with the Dutch possessions in America, the more will France and England find themselves necessitated to allow us.

The present Ministers in England have very bad advisers; the refugees, and emissaries of various other sorts, and we have n.o.body to watch and counteract, to correct or prevent anything.

The United States will soon see the necessity of uniting in measures to counteract their enemies, and even their friends. What powers Congress should have for governing the trade of the whole, for making or recommending prohibitions, or imposts, deserves the serious consideration of every man in America. If a const.i.tutional legislative authority cannot be given them, a sense of common danger and necessity should give to their recommendations all the force upon the minds of the people, which they had six years ago.

If the union of the States is not preserved, and even their unity, in many great points, instead of being the happiest people under the sun, I do not know but we may be the most miserable. We shall find our foreign affairs the most difficult to manage of any of our interests; we shall see and feel them disturbed by invisible agents, and causes, by secret intrigues, by dark and mysterious insinuations, by concealed corruptions of a thousand sorts. Hypocrisy and simulation will a.s.sume a million of shapes; we shall feel the evil, without being able to prove the cause. Those, whose penetration reaches the true source of the evil, will be called suspicious, envious, disappointed, ambitious.

In short, if there is not an authority sufficiently decisive to draw together the minds, affections, and forces of the States, in their common foreign concerns, it appears to me we shall be the sport of transatlantic politicians of all denominations, who hate liberty in every shape, and every man who loves it, and every country that enjoys it. If there is no common authority, nor any common sense to secure a revenue for the discharge of our engagements abroad for money, what is to become of our honor, our justice, our faith, our universal, moral, political, and commercial character? If there is no common power to fulfil engagements with our citizens, to pay our soldiers, and other creditors, can we have any moral character at home? Our country will become the region of everlasting discontents, reproaches, and animosities, and instead of finding our independence a blessing, we shall soon become Cappadocians enough to wish it done away.

I may be thought gloomy, but this ought not to discourage me from laying before Congress my apprehensions. The dependence of those who have designs upon us, upon our want of affection to each other, and of authority over one another, is so great, that in my opinion, if the United States do not soon show to the world a proof, that they can command a common revenue to satisfy their creditors at home and abroad, that they can act as one people, as one nation, as one man, in their transactions with foreign nations, we shall be soon so far despised, that it will be but a few years, perhaps but a few months only, before we are involved in another war.

What can I say in Holland, if a doubt is started, whether we can repay the money we wish to borrow? I must a.s.sure them in a tone, that will exclude all doubt that the money will be repaid. Am I to be hereafter reproached with deceiving the money-lenders? I cannot believe there is a man in America, who would not disdain the supposition, and therefore I shall not scruple to give the strongest a.s.surances in my power. But if there is a doubt in Congress, they ought to recall their borrowers of money.

I shall set off tomorrow for Holland, in hopes of improving my health, at the same time that I shall endeavor to a.s.sist the loan, and to turn the speculations of the Dutch merchants, capitalists and statesmen, towards America. It is of vast importance that the Dutch should form just ideas of their interests respecting the communication between us and their islands, and other colonies in America. I beg that no time may be lost in commencing conferences with M. Van Berckel upon this subject, as well as that of money; but this should not be communicated to the French nor the English, because we may depend upon it, both will endeavor to persuade the Dutch to adopt the same plan with themselves. There are jealousies on both sides the Pa.s.s of Calais, of our connexions and negotiations with the Dutch. But while we avoid as much as we can to inflame this jealousy, we must have sense and firmness and independence enough not to be intimidated by it, from availing ourselves of advantages, that Providence has placed in our power. There ever have been, and ever will be, suspicions of every honest, active, and intelligent American, and there will be as there have been insidious attempts to destroy or lessen your confidence in every such character. But if our country does not support her own interests, and her own servants, she will a.s.suredly fall. Persons, who study to preserve or obtain the confidence of America, by the favor of European statesmen, or Courts, must betray their own country to preserve their places.

For my own part, I wish Mr Jay and myself almost anywhere else but here. There is scarce any other place where we might not do some good.

Here we are in a state of annihilation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, July 23d, 1783.

Sir,

On Sat.u.r.day last I left Paris, and arrived here last night. This morning I sent M. Dumas to M. Van Berckel and M. Gyselaer, to inform them of my arrival, and to desire a conversation with them, upon the subject of the commerce between the United States and the Dutch establishments in the West Indies.

M. Van Berckel told M. Dumas, "that St Eustatia and Curacoa were open to the vessels of all nations, and to the commerce of all the world; but that it was not the interest of the West India Company alone, but that of the whole State, that obliged them to confine the commerce of their sugars to themselves, because of the great number of their refineries of sugar. That all their own sugars were not half enough to employ their sugar-houses, and that at least one half of the sugars refined in Holland were the production of the French West India Islands."

I suppose that some of these sugars may have been carried first to St Eustatia, and brought from thence to Holland, and some others may have been purchased in the ports of France, and imported raw from thence. I do not know that Dutch vessels were permitted to purchase sugars in the French Islands, and export them from thence. This matter deserves to be examined to the bottom. If France has not sugar-houses for the refinement of her own sugars, but is obliged to carry them, or to permit their being carried, to Amsterdam and Rotterdam for manufacture, why should she not be willing, that the same sugars should be carried by Americans to Boston, New York, and Philadelphia?

Surely France has no predilection for Holland rather than America. But what is of more weight, all the sugars, which America takes, will be paid for in articles more advantageous to the Islands, and to France, than the pay that is made by the Dutch. If any sugars refined in Holland are afterwards sold in France, surely it would be more for the interest of France, or rather less against her interests, to have the same sugars refined in America, and afterwards sold in France, because the price of them would be laid out by us in France. There is this difference between us and the Dutch, and all other nations, we spend in Europe all the profits we make and more, the others do not. But if the French sugars, refined in Holland, are afterwards sold in other parts of Europe, it would be just as well that we should sell them. We have sugar-houses as well as the Dutch, and ours ought not to be more obnoxious to French policy or commerce than theirs.

Sugars are a great article. There is a great consumption in America.

It is not the interest of any nation, that has sugars to sell, to lessen the consumption there. All such nations should favor that consumption, in order to multiply purchasers, and quicken the compet.i.tion, by which the price is raised. None of these nations then will wish to prevent our having sugar, provided we offer as high, or a higher price. How they will be able to arrange their plans, so that we may have enough for our own consumption, without having more, without having some for exportation, I do not know.

We have now St Eustatia and Curacoa, St Lucia and Martinique, St Thomas and St Martin's, no less than six free ports in the West Indies; and perhaps England may be induced, necessitated indeed, to add two more to the number, and make eight. At these free ports, it will be hard if we cannot find sugars, when we carry thither all our own productions, in our own s.h.i.+ps. And if the worst should happen, and all the nations, who have sugar Islands, should forbid sugars to be carried to America in any other than their own bottoms, we might depend upon having enough of this article at the free ports, to be brought away in our own s.h.i.+ps, if we should lay a prohibition or a duty upon it in foreign s.h.i.+ps. To do either, the States must be united, which the English think cannot be. Perhaps the French think so too, and in time, they may persuade the Dutch to be of the same opinion. It is to be hoped we shall disappoint them all. In a point so just and reasonable, when we are contending only for an equal chance for the carriage of our own productions, and the articles of our own consumption, when we are willing to allow to all other nations even a free compet.i.tion with us in this carriage, if we cannot unite, it will discover an imperfection and weakness in our const.i.tution, which will deserve a serious consideration.

M. Visscher, Pensionary of Amsterdam, who came in to visit me, when I had written thus far, showed me a list of the Directors of the West India Company, and refers me to M. Bicker, of Amsterdam, as one of the most intelligent of them. He says, that the Colonists of Surinam, Berbice, Essequibo, and Demarara, have been in decay, and obliged to borrow money of the merchants at home, and have entered into contracts with those merchants, to send them annually all the productions of their plantations to pay the interest and princ.i.p.al of their debts; that this will make it difficult to open the trade.

Soon after M. Visscher went out, M. Van Berckel came in. I entered into a like conversation with him, and told him that I thought the decay of their plantations in the West Indies had been owing to the rivalry of other nations, especially the English, whose Islands had greater advantages from a freer communication with North America; and I thought it might be laid down as a rule, that those Islands would flourish most in population, culture, commerce, and wealth, which had the freest intercourse with us, and that this intercourse would be a natural means of attracting the American commerce to the metropolis.

He thought so too.

I then mentioned to him the loan; and asked him, if he thought that the States-General, the States of Holland, or the Regency of Amsterdam, would be likely, in any way, to aid us? He said, no; that the country was still so much divided, that he could not depend upon any a.s.sistance in that way. That the Council of Amsterdam was well enough disposed; but that the Burgomasters were not so. That M.

Temmink, M. Huggens, and M. Rendorp, were not to be depended on in such an affair. That, therefore, our only resource was, to endeavor to gain upon the public opinion and the spirit of the nation, and that, in this respect, he would do me all the service in his power. He thought that the present uncertainty about the definitive treaty, and the fate of the Republic, would be an obstacle; but the definitive treaty once signed, he thought our loan would succeed very well. I asked him, whether he thought that the junction of three houses in my loan was any obstruction to it? and whether any one of them, or whether any other house, would do better? I told him what his brother, (now I hope in Philadelphia,) had said to M. Dumas, viz. that the house of Wilkem and Van Willink alone would succeed sooner than the three. I asked him, whether he thought the house of Hope, either alone, or in conjunction with that of the Willinks, or any other, would undertake it? He said, this might well be, and that if they saw their interest in it they would, for those mercantile houses had no other object in view. He promised me to make inquiry into this matter, and let me know the result.

Upon this occasion, I must inform Congress, that it is absolutely necessary they should send another Minister to this Republic, without loss of time; because our three present houses, before they would undertake the loan, extorted a promise from me, not to open another with any other house until the five millions should be full. This engagement I took for myself alone, however, and expressly premised that Congress should not be bound by it; that Congress should be perfectly free, and that any other Minister they might send here should be perfectly free to open another loan, when and with whom they pleased. A new Minister, therefore, may open a loan when he will, with Hope, Willink, or whom he will, and I am persuaded it would succeed to a good amount.

I made visits to day, the 25th of July, to the Grand Pensionary, the Secretary f.a.gel, the President of the week, and M. Gyselaer; and returned visits to M. Van Berckel and M. Visscher. M. Gyselaer says, that at present there is no ready money (_argent comptant_) in the Republic, but in two months there will be, and the loan will go very well.

At noon I went to the house in the Grove, to make my court to the Prince and Princess of Orange.

The Prince either happened to be in a social humor, or has had some political speculations lately, for he thought fit to be uncommonly gracious and agreeable. He made me sit, and sat down by me, and entered into familiar conversation about the negotiations of peace. He asked many questions about it, and the probability of a speedy conclusion of the definitive treaty. At length, he asked me, if Dr Franklin was left alone? I answered, that Mr Jay was with him. He asked, if I returned before the signature? I answered, that such was my intention. He asked, whether Dr Franklin was an Amba.s.sador? I answered, that he was a Minister Plenipotentiary only. He asked, if none of us were Amba.s.sadors? I answered, that we all had the same rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary, and that Congress had never yet made an Amba.s.sador. He said, he was astonished at that; that he had a long time expected to hear, that we had displayed the character of Amba.s.sadors. I asked his Highness, what reason he had for this, and what advantage there was in it? "Why," said he, "I expected that your Republic would early a.s.sert her right to appoint Amba.s.sadors.

Republics have been generally fond of appointing Amba.s.sadors, in order to be on a footing with crowned heads. Our Republic began very early.

We had eight Amba.s.sadors at the peace of Munster; one for each Province, and one supernumerary. And we always choose to appoint Amba.s.sadors, for the sake of being upon an equality with crowned heads. There are only crowned heads, Republics, and the Electors of the Empire, who have a right to send Amba.s.sadors; all others can only send Envoys, and Ministers Plenipotentiary. Princes cannot send Amba.s.sadors. I cannot, as Stadtholder, nor as Prince, nor in any other quality, send a Minister of any higher order, than an Envoy, or Minister Plenipotentiary." He asked me, what was the reason the Congress had not made use of their right? I answered his Highness, that really I did not know. It was a subject I had never much reflected on; perhaps Congress had not. Or they might think it a matter of ceremony and of show, rather than substance; or might think the expense greater than the advantage. He said, it was very true, the dignity of the rank must be supported, but he thought the advantage worth more than the expense.

I am utterly at a loss for his Highness' motives for entering so minutely into this subject. Whether M. Van Berckel, before his departure, had mentioned it; whether he thought he should please me by it; whether he thought to please Congress by it; whether he affected to interest himself in the honor of the United States; or whether any of the politicians of this, or any other country, have put him upon it, or whether it is mere accident, I know not. They are the words of a Prince, and I have reported them very exactly.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.