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Summa Theologica Novel Chapters
List of most recent chapters published for the Summa Theologica novel. A total of 816 chapters have been translated and the release date of the last chapter is Apr 02, 2024
Latest Release: Chapter 1 : Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Wh
Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For ma
- 1 Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For ma
- 2 Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of G.o.d's arm, the literal sense is not that G.o.d has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain
- 3 The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potenti
- 4 Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to G.o.d; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where G
- 5 Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not altogether simple. For whatever is from G.o.d must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which G.o.d has made, nothing is altogether simple. Th
- 6 THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 3]Whether Any Creature Can Be Like G.o.d?Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like G.o.d. For it is written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the G.o.ds like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most
- 7 THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 3]Whether Every Being Is Good?Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A. 1. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quant.i.ty, qualit
- 8 Reply Obj. 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something a.n.a.logical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuo
- 9 _______________________ QUESTION 7 THE INFINITY OF G.o.d (In Four Articles) After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and G.o.d's existence in things: for G.o.d is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is b
- 10 Whether an Infinite Mult.i.tude Can Exist?Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite mult.i.tude is possible.For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infi
- 11 Therefore it is superfluous to say that G.o.d is present in things by His essence, presence and power.Obj. 3: Further, as G.o.d by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He i
- 12 _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I. Q. 9, Art. 2]Whether to Be Immutable Belongs to G.o.d Alone?Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to G.o.d alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything whic
- 13 _I answer that,_ The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article.Hence, as G.o.d is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is Hi
- 14 Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.Obj. 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as app
- 15 is placed in the definition of "mult.i.tude"; but "mult.i.tude" is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, th
- 16 _I answer that,_ Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, G.o.d, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellec
- 17 Therefore if the essence of G.o.d is seen through any created light, such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see G.o.d; which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that ever
- 18 _On the contrary,_ A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in G.o.d as in an intelligible mirror.Therefore if G.o.d Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in
- 19 Now in both of these, human knowledge is a.s.sisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as t
- 20 Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to G.o.d in Its Literal Sense?Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to G.o.d. For all names which we apply to G.o.d are taken from creatures; as was explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are a
- 21 SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 7]Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of G.o.d Temporally?Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of G.o.d temporally. For all such names signify the
- 22 Whether This Name "G.o.d" Is Applied to G.o.d Univocally by Nature, by Partic.i.p.ation, and According to Opinion?Objection 1: It seems that this name "G.o.d" is applied to G.o.d univocally by nature, by partic.i.p.ation, and according
- 23 (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?(7) Whether the knowledge of G.o.d is discursive?(8) Whether the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things?(9) Whether G.o.d has knowledge of non-existing things?(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?(11) Whet
- 24 _I answer that,_ It must be said that the act of G.o.d's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.xii), would be the act and perfection of the divi
- 25 Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of G.o.d is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.Obj. 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowled
- 26 as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehen
- 27 SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 16]Whether G.o.d Has a Speculative Knowledge of Things?Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things, as shown above (A. 8). But speculative
- 28 Therefore there are not in G.o.d ideas of all things known by Him.Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.Obj. 4: Further, it is certain that G.o.d knows not only species,
- 29 1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.Reply Obj. 2: Not-being
- 30 Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."Obj. 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutabl
- 31 Whether Falsity Is in the Intellect?Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any
- 32 Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operato
- 33 Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in G.o.d. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot a.s.sign to G.o.d any end.Therefore there is not will in G.o.d.Obj. 2: Further, will is a kind of appet.i.te. But appet.i.te, as it is dir
- 34 This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in _Phys._ ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher in
- 35 _On the contrary,_ All good things that exist G.o.d wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things._I answer t
- 36 G.o.d'S LOVE (In Four Articles) We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of G.o.d. In the appet.i.tive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the pa.s.sions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits
- 37 Therefore G.o.d does not always love more the better things.Obj. 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now G.o.d loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore G
- 38 _I answer that,_ Mercy is especially to be attributed to G.o.d, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of pa.s.sion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at hea
- 39 Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by G.o.d towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things that are of G.o.d are well ordered [*Vulg. 'Those powers that are, are ordained of G.o.d': 'Quae au
- 40 Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.Reply Obj. 3: Predestination
- 41 Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from G.o.d: so that it came about that the effect of p
- 42 We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is the book of life?(2) Of what life is it the book?(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, A
- 43 Whether There Is Power in G.o.d?Objection 1: It seems that power is not in G.o.d. For as primary matter is to power, so G.o.d, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent--n
- 44 Reply Obj. 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is i
- 45 Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that beat.i.tude belongs to G.o.d; not that beat.i.tude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.Reply Obj. 2: Since beat.i.tude is a good, it is the objec
- 46 Nothing of all this belongs to G.o.d. Therefore generation cannot exist in G.o.d.Obj. 2: Further, procession exists in G.o.d, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained (A. 1). But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neithe
- 47 (3) Whether in G.o.d there can be several relations distinct from each other?(4) The number of these relations._______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 1]Whether There Are Real Relations in G.o.d?Objection 1: It would seem that there are no r
- 48 i, 1) it follows that a real relation in G.o.d can be based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of G.o.d according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of G.o.d to creatures are not real in Him (Q. 13, A. 7). Hen
- 49 Reply Obj. 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not onl
- 50 Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says of G.o.d (De Trin. i), that "this is truly one which has no number." But plurality implies number.Therefore there are not several persons in G.o.d.Obj. 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if
- 51 _I answer that,_ The very mode of expression itself shows that this term "person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for when we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three.Now it is c
- 52 Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in G.o.d. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another."But G.o.d is with the angels
- 53 Obj. 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notio
- 54 Obj. 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in G.o.d there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore in speaking of G.o.d we ought not to used the term principle._On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De
- 55 _______________________ QUESTION 34 OF THE PERSON OF THE SON (In Three Articles) We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son--namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea of Son is gathered f
- 56 _On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 63), that "the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power."_I answer that,_ Word implies re
- 57 FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 1]Whether This Name "Holy Ghost" Is the Proper Name of One Divine Person?Objection 1: It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to
- 58 Reply Obj. 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy
- 59 Obj. 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the "Father beget
- 60 (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular?(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?(5) Whether the same can be pre
- 61 _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 4]Whether the Concrete Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "G.o.d begot G.
- 62 Obj. 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, es
- 63 Others, therefore, considering this ident.i.ty, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said, there are no properties in G.o.d except in our way of speaking, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2). We must, h
- 64 We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?(3) Whether as regards these
- 65 Reply Obj. 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of G.o.d, but of created wisdom given by G.o.d to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He po
- 66 (4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?(6) Whether they are equal in power?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 1]Whether There Is Equality in G.o.d?Objection 1: It would seem
- 67 Obj. 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one. But in G.o.d a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions
- 68 Reply Obj. 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In G.o.d, however, it means only proc
- 69 Reply Obj. 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (Q. 38, A. 1), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature
- 70 (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government.Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures fr
- 71 For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars.Reply Obj. 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
- 72 Reply Obj. 3: In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it i
- 73 Reply Obj. 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.Reply Obj. 2: As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine n
- 74 Obj. 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow. But G.o.d is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause,
- 75 Obj. 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time._On the contrary,_ It
- 76 But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by G.o.d.Obj. 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining
- 77 Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject.For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists."Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.O
- 78 Reply Obj. 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse th
- 79 Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above (A. 1), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accid
- 80 Reply Obj. 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and
- 81 Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?(2) Whether they a.s.sume bodies?(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies a.s.sumed?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [
- 82 (2) Can he be in several places at once?(3) Can several angels be in the same place?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 1]Whether an Angel Is in a Place?Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De He
- 83 _On the contrary,_ It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into h
- 84 Obj. 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his
- 85 A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes
- 86 (2) Does one angel know another?(3) Does the angel know G.o.d by his own natural principles?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art 1]Whether an Angel Knows Himself?Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For Dionysius
- 87 FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 1]Whether the Angels Know Material Things?Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But material things cannot be the perfec
- 88 Reply Obj. 1: In the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets.The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrectio
- 89 All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible objects.Conseq
- 90 Reply Obj. 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would
- 91 Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kin
- 92 _I answer that,_ There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is f
- 93 _______________________ QUESTION 61 OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (In Four Articles) After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
- 94 _On the contrary,_ Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, which is not so s
- 95 Reply Obj. 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity; but
- 96 Reply Obj. 2: All things which make up beat.i.tude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural gifts; because no beat.i.tude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beat.i.tude.Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be t
- 97 Reply Obj. 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them.Reply Obj. 2: The heave
- 98 5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant._On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:31): "G.o.d saw all the t
- 99 Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 62, A. 6), an angel has nothing in him to r.e.t.a.r.d his action, and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest angel had greater natural energy th
- 100 Reply Obj. 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immova